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would be the correct one. Otherwise, the interpretation of the reservation would depend on
the construction of external provisions and not its carefully drafted text according to which
the Court lacks jurisdiction only when the alternative settlement procedure is exclusive.
The same issue would arise if the judgment were given a broader implication. The Court’s
reasoning with respect to Part XV of UNCLOS might be applied broadly to other non-exclu-
sive dispute settlement procedures. Thus, the judgment might be used to ﬁnd that such pro-
cedures should be excluded from the scope of application of reservations relating to “other”
dispute settlement procedures, especially when they offer no certainty that the dispute be set-
tled. Such non-exclusive dispute settlement procedures may be found in a large number of
international treaties, such as human rights conventions, environmental agreements, conven-
tions against terrorism, space law treaties, as well as regional or bilateral treaties. Again, the
Court should not lose sight of the need to consider the language of the reservation as reﬂecting
the intent of the depositing party.
Therefore, it is suggested that the new approach of the Court be reconciled with the tra-
ditional approach at least when the former does not allow to take duly into account the intent
of the depositing party. The ultimate effect of the Court’s judgment is to expand its jurisdic-
tion. It would be paradoxical that the decision would in the end prompt states to add further
reservations, as recently happened,14 or even worse to withdraw existing declarations. The
interpretation of reservations to optional clause declarations is a particularly delicate issue
where the individual interests of the parties are to be balanced with the general interest in
the sound administration of justice: if the Court could ensure stability in the interpretation
of fundamental aspects, such as the conditions on which rests its jurisdiction, access to the
Court would become much more predictable.
BEATRICE I. BONAFÉ
Sapienza University of Rome
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European Court of Justice—treaty interpretation—territorial scope of treaties—pacta tertiis
principle—subsequent practice of parties—principle of self-determination—application of
agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco to Western Sahara
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION v. FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA LIBÉRATION DE LA SAGUIA-EL-
HAMRA ET DU RIO DE ORO (FRONT POLISARIO). Case C-104/16 P.At http://curia.europa.eu.
European Court of Justice, December 21, 2016
On December 21, 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) dismissed an action brought by the Front Polisario challenging a decision
14 See the new declaration deposited by theUnited Kingdomon February 22, 2017, including a new reservation
that further limits the jurisdiction of the Court by requiring the applicant to notify the future respondent of the
existence of a dispute between the parties. The new declaration appears to be a response to the Court’s requirement
that the parties be aware of a dispute in order for the Court to have jurisdiction. See Obligations Concerning
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh.
Is. v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, paras. 46–57 (Int’l Ct. Just. Oct. 5, 2016).
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of the Council of the European Union (EU) approving the conclusion of an agreement
between the European Union and the Kingdom Morocco on the reciprocal liberalization
of certain agricultural products.1 The CJEU held, based on the relevant rules of international
law applicable between the EU andMorocco, that the agreement did not apply to the territory
of Western Sahara. Apart from its obvious political overtones, the judgment is signiﬁcant in
further developing the CJEU’s approach to the law of treaties and the principle of self-deter-
mination in international law.
Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory that has been underMoroccan occupation
since 1975. Since 1963, it has been on the United Nations’ list of “non-self-governing terri-
tories” pursuant to Article 73(e) of the UNCharter. The UNGeneral Assembly (UNGA) has
afﬁrmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination on numerous occa-
sions since 1965.2 However, the area remains in conﬂict. Morocco claims sovereignty over
Western Sahara and occupies most of its territory. The National Liberation Movement for
Western Sahara, Front Polisario, formally proclaimed independence as the government-in-
exile of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1976. Following a ceaseﬁre in 1991, a
UN peacekeeping operation (the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western
Sahara or MINURSO) was established to promote a peaceful settlement; its mandate was
most recently renewed in April 2017.3
Western Sahara has also been the subject of an Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), in which the ICJ found the ties between Morocco and Western
Sahara insufﬁcient to establish the former’s territorial sovereignty over the latter, and that
the people of Western Sahara had the right to self-determination in relation to the territory.4
Neither the EU nor any of its member states ofﬁcially recognize Morocco’s claims to the
territory, nor do they recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. At the same time, the
EU has entered into several agreements with the Kingdom of Morocco, including the 1996
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (Association Agreement),5 providing for the lib-
eralization of trade in agricultural and ﬁsheries products, and a 2010 Liberalisation
Agreement,6 which built upon and modiﬁed the Association Agreement. These agreements
do not specify whether they apply to the territory of Western Sahara, but they have been
applied de facto to products originating from the territory in some cases.
1 Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front Populaire pour la Libération de la Saguia-El-
Hamra et Du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario) (Eur. Ct. Justice Dec. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Judgment]. The subject
of the challenge was the EUCouncil’s Decision 2012/497/EU ofMarch 8, 2012. Decisions and documents of the
Court cited herein are available online at its website, http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
2 See, e.g., GA Res. 2072 (XX) (Dec. 16, 1965); GA Res. 34/37 (Nov. 21, 1979); GA Res. 35/19 (Nov. 11,
1980).
3 SC Res. 2351(April 28, 2017).
4 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ Rep. 12, paras. 70, 162 (Oct. 16).
5 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and Their
Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part, entered into force March 1,
2000, 2000 O.J. (L70/2).
6 Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the European Community and the Kingdom of
Morocco Concerning Reciprocal Liberalisation Measures on Agricultural and Products, Processes Agricultural
Products, Fish and Fishery Products, the Replacement of Protocols 1, 2, and 3 of their Annexes and
Amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European
Communities and Their Member States of the One Part, and the Kingdom ofMorocco, of the Other Part, entered
into force October 1, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L241/4) [hereinafter Liberalisation Agreement].
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In November 2012, Front Polisario ﬁled an action to annul the Council Decision on the
conclusion of the Liberalisation Agreement, alleging violations of EU law and international
law. The case ﬁrst came before the General Court,7 which faced two main questions: whether
Front Polisario had standing under EU law to challenge the contested decision (admissibility
issue); and whether the agreement should be annulled (substantive issues). The substantive
issues included alleged violations of both international law (inter alia, the principle of self-
determination, international humanitarian law) and EU law (e.g., the failure to state adequate
reasons).
Regarding admissibility, the General Court found that the contested decision was of
“direct and individual concern” to Front Polisario and thus fulﬁlled the criteria for instituting
proceedings to challenge an act under EU law.8 This ﬁnding turned on the General Court’s
interpretation of the territorial scope of the Liberalisation Agreement. It found that since the
Liberalisation Agreement applied to the territory ofWestern Sahara, the Agreement produced
legal effects, not only for Morocco, but also for Front Polisario.
On the substantive issues, the General Court characterized Front Polisario’s application as
essentially concerning the argument that the EU was absolutely prohibited from concluding
with a third state an agreement which applies to a “disputed territory” (para. 117, General
Court Judgment). That prohibition arguably stemmed from customary international law
binding upon the EU and its member states (para. 140, General Court Judgment). The
General Court reviewed the various grounds upon which the applicant alleged the incompat-
ibility of the decision with “general international law”—arguments based on the right to self-
determination, the relative effect of treaties, and the infringement of humanitarian law—and
found no prohibition against concluding an agreement that applied to a “disputed territory”
(para. 205, General Court Judgment). The General Court did, however, ﬁnd a violation of
EU procedural law: the EU institutions had failed to ensure that the conclusion of an agree-
ment in these circumstances would not infringe the fundamental rights of the persons con-
cerned (para. 228, General Court Judgment). TheGeneral Court thus annulled the contested
decision insofar as it approved the application of the Liberalisation Agreement to Western
Sahara (para. 247, General Court Judgment).
The Council appealed the judgment. On September 13, 2016, Advocate General (AG)
Wathelet delivered his Opinion, arguing that the Council Decision should not be annulled.9
The AG’s Opinion turned on a different assessment of the “territorial scope” of the agree-
ment, which was “of paramount importance . . . because it permeates the entire action for
annulment” (para. 54, AG Opinion). The AG argued that Front Polisario lacked standing
to challenge the decision because the agreement in question did not apply to the territory
of Western Sahara. The ﬁrst reason was based on Western Sahara’s status as a non-self-gov-
erning territory, as determined by Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. The AG
7 Case T-512/12, Front Populaire pour la Libération de la Saguia-El-Hamra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario)
v. Council of the European Union, Judgment (General Court Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter General Court
Judgment].
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 263, para. 4, Dec. 13,
2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TFEU].
9 Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front Populaire pour la Libération de la Saguia-El-
Hamra et du Rio de Oro (Front Polisario), Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet Delivered on 13
September 2016, Doc. No. 62016CC0104 [hereinafter AG Opinion].
INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS2017 733
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.50
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Copenhagen University Library, on 03 Dec 2017 at 10:24:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
disagreed with the General Court’s description of Western Sahara as a “disputed territory”;
rather, he contended, it had a separate and distinct status from the administering state under
international law (para. 75, AGOpinion). Accordingly, the Liberalisation Agreement did not
apply to Western Sahara without the express extension to that territory at the time of ratiﬁ-
cation (paras. 75–82, AG Opinion). The AG further relied on arguments based on the rel-
ative effect of treaties (para. 109, AG Opinion) and subsequent practice (para. 87, AG
Opinion). Thus, while the General Court dismissed arguments based on international law,
the AG based his conclusions on the application of international law principles.
On December 21, 2016, the CJEU set aside the judgment of the General Court and dis-
missed Front Polisario’s action as inadmissible. Following the AG’s Opinion, it concluded
that the Liberalisation Agreement did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara and,
since Front Polisario could not therefore be considered a party “affected” by the agreement,
it lacked standing to challenge the contested decision.
In order to determine the territorial application of the Liberalisation Agreement, the CJEU
employed methods of treaty interpretation set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT),10 which represent customary international law principles binding
upon the EU.11 In particular, it considered Article 31(3)(c), according to which a treaty is to
be interpreted taking into account relevant rules of international law applicable between the
parties (para. 86). In this regard, the CJEU referred speciﬁcally to: (1) the principle of self-
determination; (2) the territorial scope of treaties; and (3) the pact tertiis principle of the rel-
ative effect of treaties.
The CJEU found that self-determination is not only a principle of customary international
law but also “a legally enforceable right erga omnes and one of the essential principles of inter-
national law” (para. 88), which applies in the relations between the EU and Morocco.
Referring to numerous international instruments and case law, the CJEU found that the ter-
ritory of Western Sahara has a “separate and distinct status” (para. 92). Accordingly, the
CJEU rejected the Commission’s argument that the term “territory of the Kingdom of
Morocco” in Article 94 of the Association Agreement should be interpreted to include the
territory of Western Sahara (id.).
The CJEU also took into account the principle enshrined in VCLTArticle 29, which states
that “[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty
is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.” The term “territory” in its ordi-
nary meaning applies to geographical space in which a state exercises sovereign powers under
international law (para. 95). If a treaty is to be applied beyond the territory of the state party,
the CJEU held, that must be expressly provided for in the treaty, or otherwise established
(paras. 96–98). Since the Association Agreement did not expressly state that it applied to
Western Sahara, the CJEU concluded, it could not be interpreted as applying to a non-
self-governing territory.
The CJEU took into account the rule on the relative effect of treaties, expressed in
VCLT Article 34, according to which a treaty does not create rights and obligations for a
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Morocco
has been a party since 1972, but the European Union is not.
11 SeeCase C-386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v.HauptzollamtHamburg-Hafen, Grand Chamber Judgment, para.
42 (Eur. Ct. Justice Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Brita].
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW734 Vol. 111:3
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.50
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Copenhagen University Library, on 03 Dec 2017 at 10:24:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
third state without its consent (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). Because Western Sahara is
a non-self-governing territory, the CJEU considered it a “third party” within the meaning of
this principle (para. 106). To interpret the Association Agreement as applying to the territory
of Western Sahara without its consent would therefore violate the pacta tertiis principle (para.
107).
The CJEU did not accept the argument that because the Liberalisation Agreement did not
explicitly exclude its application to the territory ofWestern Sahara, it should be interpreted to
apply in that territory. According to that argument, had the Council and Commission
opposed the application of the Liberalisation Agreement to the territory of Western
Sahara, they would have said as much in the latter agreement. In this regard, the CJEU
referred to VCLT Article 30(2), according to which “[w]hen a treaty speciﬁes that it is subject
to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the pro-
visions of that other treaty prevail.” Because the Liberalisation Agreement was designed to
amend the earlier Association Agreement, the former was regarded as subordinate to the ear-
lier agreement (para. 112). The provisions of the Association Agreement (including the ter-
ritorial application clause) had not been amended by the Liberalisation Agreement, and
therefore continued to apply. There was no need to include a clause expressly excluding
Western Sahara from the scope of the Liberalisation Agreement, because at the time of its
conclusion the Association Agreement did not extend to that territory (para. 114).
Lastly, although the EU and Morocco had applied the agreements de facto with respect to
the territory ofWestern Sahara, the CJEU held that this did not count as “subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty”within themeaning of VCLTArticle 31(3)(b). The practice of
the EU and Morocco did not reﬂect the existence of an agreement to modify the interpreta-
tion of the agreements’ territorial application (para. 122).
Based on these conclusions, the CJEU found that the Liberalisation Agreement did not
apply to the territory of Western Sahara. Accordingly, since the contested decision was not
of “direct concern” to Front Polisario, the CJEU set aside the judgment of the General Court
and ruled Front Polisario’s action as inadmissible.
* * * *
Of the various issues of international law raised by the CJEU’s judgment, its interpretation
and application of VCLTArticle 31(3)(c) is perhaps the most troublesome. Article 31 sets out
the general rule of treaty interpretation. No hierarchy exists between the different elements of
the rule, and the reference to other relevant rules of international law applicable between the
parties (as contemplated in Article 31(3)(c)) is just one of a number of factors to be taken into
account in interpretation. Yet the CJEU gave special emphasis to Article 31(3)(c) in order to
take account of, and give priority to other principles of international law. In this way, the
CJEU has turned treaty interpretation on its head, taking broad principles of international
law as the starting point for its analysis rather than the text of the treaty itself.
The ﬁrst of these principles was the principle of self-determination. Given Western
Sahara’s “separate and distinct status” from the administering state (Morocco) under interna-
tional law, the CJEU rejected the argument that “territory of the Kingdom of Morocco” (as
used in Article 94 of the Association Agreement) could be interpreted to include the territory
of Western Sahara (para. 92). The CJEU did not enquire, however, into what other possible
legal consequences might ﬂow from a non-self-governing territory possessing “separate and
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distinct status.” In the CJEU’s view, it seems, the principle of self-determination was relevant
only in regard to interpreting the territorial application of the treaty. Somewhat ironically, the
principle of self-determination (which should protect the rights of a non-self-governing ter-
ritory) is used to ﬁnd that the decision approving the conclusion of the Liberalisation
Agreement was not of “direct concern” to Front Polisario, thus preventing it from challenging
an EU act that infringes on that very right.
The second principle was the rule enshrined in VCLT Article 29. According to the CJEU,
this rule precludes the application of the agreement to the territory ofWestern Sahara, unless a
different intention is apparent from the treaty or otherwise established. Article 29 was
intended merely to set out a general rule that a treaty is to apply with respect to the territories
of its parties, and applies where a treaty does not deﬁne its territorial application.12 The
CJEU, however, gives much more signiﬁcance to this provision, interpreting it to mean
that a treaty only applies with respect to territory over which a state exercises full sovereign
powers, unless there is an express provision providing for its application to other territory.
The third broad principle was the pacta tertiis rule. The CJEU previously applied the prin-
ciple to interpret the EU-Israel Association Agreement in Brita,13 ﬁnding that the agreement
could not be applied to the territory of theWest Bank since doing so would apply a treaty to a
third party without its consent. Brita was rightly criticized because it resulted in “somewhat
stretching the scope of the pacta tertiis rule” in order to avoid the politically sensitive question
of the territorial limits of Israel.14 As in Brita, the CJEU refers to imposing obligations on
“third parties,” whereas VCLT Article 34 refers to “third states.”15 The provision does not
derive its justiﬁcation from contract law principles (e.g., the principle that agreements neither
impose obligations nor confer rights upon third parties) but from the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and the sovereign equality of states.16 The CJEU has not explained whether the rule
applies to all “third parties” or only third “state-like” entities.
Another problematic applicationof theVCLTprinciples on treaty interpretation is theCJEU’s
analysis of “subsequent practice.” The General Court took into account the practice of the EU
andMorocco in applying the Association Agreement to interpret the territorial application of the
Liberalisation Agreement. The CJEU found that the General Court erred by failing to enquire
whether such practice reﬂected the existence of an agreement between the parties, as required by
VCLTArticle 31(3)(b) (paras. 120–25).While the agreements had been applied de facto to prod-
ucts originating from the territory of Western Sahara in certain cases, the CJEU found that this
practice did not reﬂect the existence of an agreement between the parties to “amend the interpre-
tation of . . . the Association Agreement” (para. 122). To reach this ﬁnding, the CJEU applies
some interesting, if tortured, logic. Had the EU intended the agreements to apply to the territory
ofWestern Sahara, it argued, that “would necessarily have entailed conceding that the European
12 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, Commentary to Art. 25, at 213, para 5, in Reports
of the International LawCommission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session,
UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) [hereinafter ILC Commentary on Final
Draft Articles].
13 Brita, supra note 11.
14 See, e.g., Helmut Philipp Aust, Alejandro Rodiles& Peter Staubach,Unity or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and
Treaty Interpretation, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 75, 103 (2014).
15 Emphasis added. Under Article 2(1)(h) of the VCLT, “Third State” is deﬁned as “a State not a party to the
treaty.”
16 ILC Commentary on Final Draft Articles, supra note 12, Commentary to Art. 30.
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Union intended to implement those agreements in amanner incompatible with the principles of
self-determination and of the relative effect of treaties, even though the European Union repeat-
edly reiterated the need to comply with those principles, as the Commission points out” (para.
123).TheCJEUalso referred to “the principle thatTreaty obligationsmust be performed in good
faith” (para. 124). The CJEU seems to argue that since the EU institutions profess to respect
international law, the Association Agreement must be interpreted in a way that assumes the
EU respects principles of international law. The CJEU does not make a convincing distinction
between instances of de facto application of the Association Agreement, and “subsequent prac-
tice” that would be relevant for the purposes of treaty interpretation.
The Front Polisario judgment involves a clear political dimension. The status of Western
Sahara is subject to continuing international negotiations and the CJEU was certainly aware
that the outcome of the case could impact relations between the EU and Morocco. Indeed,
the Council and Commission highlighted the sensitive political dimension of the case, argu-
ing that it called upon the CJEU to make political, rather than legal assessments.17
Signiﬁcantly, the judgment conﬁrmed the status of Western Sahara as a non-self-governing
territory, not a part of Moroccan territory.
The EUhas been criticized for violating the principle of self-determination by entering into
such agreements with Morocco.18 That criticism raises the questions (1) whether the EU is
obligated not to recognize as lawful a situation created through a serious breach of peremptory
normof international law and (2)what obligations it has to ensure the respect for human rights
of the people inWestern Sahara. By denying Front Polisario’s standing, the CJEU was able to
maintain the appearance of supporting the principle of self-determination and international
legality, while at the same time avoiding these more delicate legal and political questions. The
CJEU was right to ﬁnd that the Liberalisation Agreement did not apply to the territory of
Western Sahara. Yet this does not necessarily mean that Front Polisario was not “speciﬁcally
affected” by theCouncil decision approving the agreement. TheCJEU fails to explain why the
issue of Front Polisario’s standing, an issue of EU procedural law, is dependent entirely on the
Agreement’s territorial application, an issue of international law. The outcome of this reason-
ing is that a national liberation movement that represents the Sahrawi in international nego-
tiations (possessing international legal personality) cannot challenge an EU act that clearly
affects the rights of, and is of direct concern to, the people of Western Sahara.
Finally, and problematically, the judgment is an example of the CJEU “instrumentalizing”
international law. At ﬁrst glance, the CJEU’s reasoning may appear to be a logical and faithful
application of international legal principles. Yet the CJEU focused almost entirely on treaty
interpretation, in particular on VCLT Article 31(3)(c). It applied principles of international
law without taking into account how those principles are actually understood in international
law or how they have been applied by other courts and interpretative bodies. The CJEU may
thus appear to be committed to “the strict observance and the development of international
law” as required by the Treaty on the European Union,19 but upon closer inspection it has
actually employed these principles to avoid enquiring into the legal ramiﬁcations the EU’s
17 AG Opinion, supra note 9, para. 141.
18 See Sandra Hummelbrunner & Anne-Carlijn Prickartz, It’s Not the Fish that Stinks! EU Trade Relations with
Morocco Under the Scrutiny of the General Court of the European Union, 32(83) UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 19
(2016).
19 TFEU, supra note 8, Art. 3(5).
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policy toward Western Sahara.20 In other cases involving areas of contested sovereignty such
as Anastasiou21 (Northern Cyprus) and Brita (West Bank) the CJEU similarly focused on
narrow issues of treaty interpretation without taking into account the broader context of
the dispute and other principles of international law.
InKadi, the CJEUheld that the EU “must respect international law in the exercise of its pow-
ers” and stressed that all EU acts must respect fundamental rights.22 Yet in Front Polisario the
CJEU used principles of public international law to avoid review of an EU act that arguably
violates the rights of the people of Western Sahara. The CJEU integrates elements of interna-
tional law into its legal reasoning, but does so only as a subsidiary means of interpreting EU law,
further illustrating how the CJEU applies principles of public international law, including the
law of treaties, through an EU law lens. Given the political and diplomatic complexities sur-
rounding the EU’s policy in this area, it is unsurprising that the Court arrives at such a result.
JED ODERMATT
University of Copenhagen
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.50
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—arbitrary arrest and detention—right to a fair
trial—provisional measures—exhaustion of local remedies—derogation—default judgment
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS v. LIBYA. Appl. No. 002/2013. At
http://www.african-court.org.
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 3, 2016.
On June 3, 2016, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (the Court) rendered
its ﬁrst default judgment,1 in a case brought by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) against Libya for alleged violations of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter).2 The Commission had alleged that
20 This would not be the ﬁrst time. In Racke the Court applied the principle of rebus sic stantibus to avoid sen-
sitive questions regarding the conﬂict in the Balkans. Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt
Mainz, Judgment (Eur. Ct. Justice June 16, 1998).
21 Case C-432/92, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou
(Pissouri) Ltd., Judgment (Eur. Ct. Justice July 5, 1994).
22 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation
v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment, para. 291 (Eur.
Ct. Justice Sept. 3, 2008).
1 African Commission onHuman and Peoples’Rights v. Libya, App. No. 002/2013, Judgment (June 3, 2016),
available at http://en.african-court.org/index.php/49-41st-ordinary-session/767-appl-no-002-2013-the-african-
commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-libya-2 [hereinafter Judgment].
2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 1520
UNTS 217, 21 ILM 58 (1982) (entered into force October 21, 1998), available at http://www.achpr.org/instru-
ments/achpr. The Commission was established by Part II (Arts. 30–61) of the Charter. The Court was established
under the Protocol to the Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Protocol), adopted by member states of what was then the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998. That Protocol came into force on
January 25, 2004. Under Article 5(1) of the Protocol and Rule 33 of the Rules of the Court, the Commission
is entitled to submit cases to the Court. Libya ratiﬁed the Charter in 1986 and acceded to the Protocol in 2003.
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